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Abstract
This paper analyzes the adverse incentive effects produced by money injections
of benefactors (sugar daddies SD). We show that the existence of a SD induces
the club to choose a riskier investment strategy and the more the SD commits to
bailout the club, the more the clubs’ optimal level of riskiness increases. Moreover,
a private SD bails out the club less often than a public SD. Our model further
shows that a ”too-big-to-fail” phenomenon exists because it is optimal to always
bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently large.
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1 Introduction
At the start of the 2004/05 season, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)
introduced the Club Licensing System. To be admitted to UEFA’s club competitions, each
club must fulfil a series of defined quality standards falling into five principal categories:
sporting, infrastructure, personnel, legal and financial. In 2010, a new and enhanced set
of regulations was approved advancing the idea of “financial fair play”. A slightly revised
edition is in place since 2012 (UEFA, 2012b). We will refer to the new set of regulations
as FFP regulations.
One major effect of the successful implementation of the FFP regulations will be
the abrogation of the typical “money injection” mechanism, where a benefactor (sugar
daddy) steps in and pays the open bills at the end of the season after the club overspend on
player salaries and transfers in a gamble on success, which ultimately went wrong. Conn
(2011) speaks of ”staggering £ 2.3 bn” which current English football owners ”injected”
into their football clubs in order to keep them in business. But the injection of new
funds to avoid insolvency is not only common in regulatory environments where clubs are
governed as private firms like in the English case. Clubs governed as members associations
are often perceived as ”community projects”, where in the eyes of their supporters local
governments have an obligation to step in and inject new money in case of a potential
shutdown due to the inability of the club to pay the open bills.1
Provided that the FFP regulations will work, the option that private or public sugar
daddies step in to pay the open bills of European football clubs will be severely restricted,
almost abrogated. Based on a simple game-theoretical model, this paper makes a first
step to analyze the consequences of the abrogation of money injections from sugar daddies
on the riskiness of the club’s investment strategy. In our model, the club chooses a level
of riskiness to produce a stochastic club value. A higher level of riskiness increases the
expected club level, but it also increases the variance in the club value. Moreover, the
club’s likelihood of bankruptcy increases with a higher level of riskiness. If the club
goes bankrupt, a risk neutral (private or public) sugar daddy bails out the club with a
certain probability. In the case of a non-bailout, the club must bear shutdown costs and
a certain collateral damage of the club’s bankruptcy incurs for society, while in the case
of a bailout, the sugar daddy must bear the bailout costs.
Our model shows that the existence of a sugar daddy induces the club to choose
a riskier investment strategy as compared to the scenario without bailout possibilities.
Particularly, a higher willingness of the sugar daddy to bailout the club results in a
higher level of riskiness of the club. Moreover, a private sugar daddy bails out the club
less often than a public sugar daddy. We also find that a ”too-big-to-fail” phenomenon
1The prominent example of a non-profit association, which is operating in an environment with ”soft
public budget constraints” is Real Madrid (see Downie 2009 for more detail).
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exists because it is optimal to always bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently
large. Finally, we derive conditions under which the FFP and the pre-FFP regulations,
respectively, are desirable from a welfare perspective.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a short look at the related literature in Section
2, we provide a detailed explanation of the FFP regulations in Section 3. Section 4
presents the model. First, we introduce the notation and assumptions. Second, we solve
our two-stage game and then present the results. In Section 5, we discuss other potential
inefficiencies induced through money injections. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main
findings and concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Despite the topicality of the issue, the FFP regulations have received little attention
in the academic literature. Exceptions are Madden (2012b), Vo¨pel (2011), Drut and
Raballand (2012) and Storm (2012). Madden (2012b) studies the consequences of the FFP
regulation based on an economic model of a sports league, which determines endogenously
team qualities, ticket prices, salaries as well as the utilities accruing to fans, owners and
players. His model shows that FFP regulations will have negative welfare consequences
if the supply of talent is sufficiently elastic. The main argument is that the missing
money injections “lead to a reduction in all team qualities, and this will lead to a Pareto
dis-improvement for all fans of the league, as well as a fall in owner utilities and player
wages” (Madden 2012b, p.18).
In a conceptual paper, Vo¨pel (2011, p. 59) argues that the FFP regulations might
produce a more unbalanced league rather than making it more balanced because ‘a tighter
regulation might turn out to be dynamically inefficient as it unintentionally protects well-
established clubs from being challenged by non-established clubs.”
In another conceptual paper Storm (2012) adapts the concept of “soft budget con-
straints” introduced by Kornai (1980) in the context of post-socialist transition economies
to the specific environment of European football clubs. Building on many interesting ob-
servations about the political, social and economic environment of football clubs, the
paper provides intuitive insights into the process that leads to the development of “soft
budget constraints” and interprets FFP as an important countermeasure.
Finally, Drut and Raballand (2012) analyze the influence of financial regulation for
European football clubs. Based on an analytical model of a professional sports league
with win-maximizing clubs, they show that clubs which are allowed to run deficits hire
better players and have better sportive results compared to clubs that have a strict budget
constraint as imposed by UEFA’s FFP regulations.
However, neither of these papers analyzes the mechanisms through which the money
injections of (private or public) benefactors adversely affect the incentives of decision-
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makers in football clubs. Our paper makes a first step in order to partly fill this gap.
Franck (2010) deals with some possible reasons for benefactors to invest great sums
of money in football clubs. First, there are positive spillovers to their other businesses.
Second, sugar daddies might seek social and political acceptance or legitimacy after having
accumulated great wealth in questionable ways. Third, sugar daddies might launder
money by using the club as an access to high value cash transactions and finally, they
might be interested in consumption as sportsman owners.
Based on a contest model, Lang et al. (2011) analyze how the appearance of a bene-
factor (”sugar daddy”) changes the competition in the league. They show that the effect
on competitive balance depends on the market sizes of the clubs and the win preference
of the sugar daddy.2 If the sugar daddy invests in a large club, social welfare in a sugar
daddy league can be higher, as compared to a league without a sugar daddy. On the
other hand, social welfare will always be lower if the sugar daddy invests in a small club.
However, Lang et al. (2011) do not consider the adverse incentive effects of bailouts
through sugar daddies.
Our paper is also related to the finance literature which studies the so-called ”lender
of last resort” (LLR). The LLR such as the central bank of a country provides liquidity
assistance during a financial crisis to avoid the bankruptcy of other financial institutions
that are considered to be systemically important and therefore “too-big-to-fail” (see e.g.,
Rochet and Tirole 1996, Holmstrom and Tirole 1998, Repullo 2000, Rochet and Vives
2004 and Goodhart and Huang 2005).
Based on a model of incomplete contracts, Repullo (2000) examines the conditions
under which the central bank or the deposit insurance corporation should act as a LLR
and finds that the latter should deal with large liquidity shocks, while the former should
take care of small shocks (relative to the size of the bank). Goodhart and Huang (2003)
examine the central bank’s optimal rescue policy whether to support or not a bank that
requires help. In a dynamic setting, they find that time-varying variables such as the
likelihood of a contagious risk influence the optimal rescue policy. In a static setting,
they show that the central bank will only provide assistance to banks whose size is
above a certain threshold and thus are systemically important and therefore “too-big-to-
fail”. Moreover, Ennis and Malek (2005) claim that ”a bank tends to become larger and
riskier if its uninsured creditors believe that they will benefit from too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
coverage.” Thus, an unintended consequence of the too-big-to-fail policy is the creation
of a moral hazard problem (Stern and Feldman 2004).
It should be noted that theses models feature elements that are specific to the financial
2According to the so-called “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis,” fans prefer to attend games with
an uncertain outcome (”competitive balance”) and enjoy close championship races (Rottenberg 1956 and
Neale 1964). For theoretical studies that deal with competitive balance in team sports leagues, see e.g.,
Ke´senne (2000), Vrooman (1995), Lenten (2008), Dietl et al. (2009), Grossmann et al. (2010) and Dietl
et al. (2011).
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sector (e.g., interbank lending, supply of liquidity and liquidity shocks, bank runs, default
risks, portfolio optimization and so on). In contrast, our model, which is specifically
tailored towards the sports sector, focuses on a sports club and a benefactor (sugar
daddy). Similar to the models in finance, our paper is able to show that a sugar daddy
- like a central bank - always bails out clubs above a threshold size. In addition, we also
identify a moral hazard problem because clubs will choose a riskier strategy in a scenario
with a sugar daddy than without one. However, the FFP regulations will render the
bailout possibilities of SD more difficult or even impossible.
3 Details of Financial Fair Play Regulations
The background against which the amendment of the regulations was approved is a picture
of financial distress, which has been typical for European football since many years:3 Of
the 734 European top division clubs 56% reported net losses in the financial year 2010.
The reported total income of the 734 clubs amounted to e 12,797 billion, whereas the
costs totalled e 14,389 billion. In sum the 734 European top division clubs dissipated
financial value equalling e 1,641 billion. Net losses increased by 760% compared to the
financial year 2006. A group of 78 clubs spent more than 100% of their revenues on
wages alone. The percentage of clubs with negative net equity facing a situation with
debts larger than reported assets is 36%.4
The cornerstone of the FFP regulations is the break-even requirement defined in UEFA
(2012b, Article 58 ff). It basically requires that a club entering UEFA competitions lives
within its own means by balancing ”relevant income” and ”relevant expenses” in the
“monitoring period”. Both, relevant income and relevant expenses, are defined in great
detail in the regulations. The monitoring period assessed for the license 2013/14 covers
the two previous seasons 2011/2012 and 2012/13. From then onwards the three previous
seasons will be assessed for every new license season, for example the 2014/15 license
will be granted based on an assessment of the 2013/14, 2012/13 and 2011/12 seasons.
By demanding that the break-even requirement must be fulfilled on average in the three
years covering the monitoring period of every license season, club management is left
with some discretion to react to unpredictable events.
In the future, contributions from equity participants and/or related parties can only
be used up to certain limits that decrease over time as an instrument to balance relevant
expenses. The latter include player wages and transfer expenditures as their presumably
most important sub-categories. Despite their exclusion from relevant income the contri-
butions of benefactors yet are still possible as a closer look at relevant expenses reveals.
3For recent studies of the European football leagues, see e.g., Frick (2007), Vrooman (2007), Dietl
et al. (2008) and Peeters (2012).
4See UEFA (2012a), p. 16-18, p. 54-90.
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It shows that for example depreciation/impairment of tangible fixed assets, expenditure
on youth development activities or expenditure on community development activities are
not counted as relevant expenses and therefore do not enter the calculation of the break-
even. Benefactors can still support the club financially under the new regime, yet no
longer in order to cover the losses from ongoing wage and transfer payments. Instead,
they can contribute to the construction of new infrastructure (e.g., stadia) and invest in
the development of young players and fan networks.
Moreover, there will be a soft implementation of the break-even requirement on a
sliding scale: Article 61 defines the acceptable aggregate deviation from the break-even
requirement at e 5m. In the first two license seasons 2013/14 and 2014/15 the deviation
is allowed to exceed e 5m up to a limit of e 45m. This upper limit will be reduced to
e 30m for the license seasons 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18. A lower amount will be
decided by the UEFA Executive Committee for the monitoring periods assessed in the
following years.
4 Model
4.1 Notation and Assumptions
We consider a representative club that chooses a certain level of riskiness x ∈ R+ to
produce a stochastic club value given by v(x,m), where m ∈ R+ is the market size of the
club. We assume that the club value is normally distributed with v(x,m) ∼ N (µC , σ2C) .
The expected club value is given by E[v] = µC(x) <∞ and the variance in the club value
is V [v] = σ2C(x) <∞. We assume that v(x,m) satisfies the following assumptions:
A1. ∂µC(x)
∂x
> 0 and
∂σ2C(x)
∂x
> 0
A2. ∂v(x,m)
∂m
> 0
From A1, it follows that the club’s risk choice x has two effects: on the one hand, a
higher value of x increases the expected club value µv(x), but on the other hand, it also
increases the variance in the club value σ2v(x). That is, the ”cost” of the higher expected
club value is the increase in the variance. In other words, the club can choose a strategy
with a low expected return and low risk, or it can choose a strategy with a high expected
return and high risk. A2 implies that given a certain level of riskiness, a higher market
size m produces a higher club value. If the club chooses zero risk, then the club value is
assumed to be pi ∈ R+, i.e., µC(0) = pi.
Moreover, the club’s expected utility function is given by E[uC(v(x,m), r)] where r
is the club’s risk parameter. We assume that the club can either be risk-averse (r > 0)
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or risk-seeking (r < 0). We impose the following standard assumption on the club’s
expected utility:5
A3. ∂uC
∂v
> 0 ∀v ≥ 0 and sign
[
∂2uC
∂v2
]
= −sign[r]
A4. sign
[
∂uC
∂r
]
= −sign[r]
A3 implies that a higher club value increases the club’s utility, while it depends on the
club’s preferences regarding risk whether utility is concave or convex in the club value,
i.e., sign
[
∂2uC
∂v2
]
= −sign[r]. If the club is risk-averse (risk-seeking) its utility is concave
(convex) in v, while it is linear in v if the club is risk neutral. A4 shows that the effect
of a higher risk parameter on utility depends on the club’s preferences regarding risk.
Moreover, we assume that if the club value is zero the club utility is zero as well, i.e.,
uC(0, r) = 0.
Moreover, we assume that the level of riskiness x influences the club’s likelihood
of bankruptcy. For example, a club like Borussia Dortmund, winner of the German
championship in the seasons 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, had revenues of e138m in sea-
son 2010/2011. Compared to the European revenue giants Real Madrid (e480m), FC
Barcelona (e451m), Manchester United (e367m) or Bayern Munich (e321m), Dortmund
is a small or medium sized competitor at the Champions League level (see Deloitte 2012,
Appendix 21a for all numbers). If the management of Dortmund acts responsibly, it
accepts Champions League mediocrity and restrains from bidding for star players like
Ronaldo, Messi, Kaka` or Ribe´ry. However, the management of Dortmund could pursue
the same risky strategy as in the seasons 2003-2005 and spend a large fraction of or even
more than their revenues on salaries and transfers in an attempt to win the Champions
League against rivals with much larger revenue potential. If the gamble goes wrong and
the team fails to qualify or survive the group stage for consecutive seasons, the situation
of February 2005, where Dortmund ended up on the verge of bankruptcy 8 years after
having won the Champions League title, may soon reoccur.
Denote by pl(x) ∈ [0, 1] the probability that the club loses the gamble on success and
becomes insolvent, while 1− pl(x) is the probability that the club wins the gamble. We
assume that pl(0) = 0 and a higher level of riskiness increases the club’s probability to
become insolvent with a non-decreasing rate, i.e., ∂pl
∂x
≡ p′l(x) > 0 ∀x ≥ 0 and ∂
2pl
∂x2
=
p′′l (x) ≥ 0. We refer to pl(x) as the bankruptcy function and to p′l(x) as the responsiveness
of the bankruptcy function with respect to the club’s risky behavior.
In the case of a successful gamble, the club receives its expected utility uC . In the case
of an unsuccessful gamble, we introduce a new actor into our model to which we refer to
as the ”sugar daddy” (SD). The SD is assumed to be risk neutral because s/he is well
5Note that for notational simplicity, we omit the expectations operator E and we henceforth write
for the expected utility u instead of E[u].
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diversified.6 The SD has the possibility to bailout the club in the case of an unsuccessful
gamble. We denote the likelihood of a bailout by pb ∈ [0, 1], and hence, the likelihood
that SD does not bailout the club is given by 1 − pb. The FFP regulations render the
bailout possibilities of SD more difficult (reflected by a decrease in pb) or even impossible
(pb = 0).
In the case of a non-bailout, the club goes bankrupt and it faces the shutdown costs
s ∈ R+. Additionally, we assume that the collateral damage of the club’s bankruptcy
amounts to d ∈ R+. A lot of elements add up to collateral damage: Fans and supporters
lose their joint object of identification in case of a shutdown and therefore would have
to at least temporarily write off emotional and social capital, leading to a “wave” of
unhappiness with potential spillovers to the local economy. Additionally, employees of
the club lose their job, thus raising unemployment in the city, supplier bills remain unpaid,
which might cause other bankruptcies, the municipal stadium loses its most important
tenant, an important leisure opportunity disappears at least temporarily, the image of
the city deteriorates which might discourage investors.
In the case of a bailout, the SD has to bear the bailout costs, which are given by
b ∈ R+ and the expected club value is assumed to be zero. This assumption reflects that
the expected club value decreases in the case of an unsuccessful gamble. In the extreme
case, the club value is zero.7 In practice sugar daddies avoid the insolvency of their clubs
by either injecting new equity, swapping debt into equity, or providing additional soft
loans. The latter are either non-interest bearing, at below-market rates of interest, or
characterized by long repayment periods with interest holidays. For example, according
to Deloitte (2012, p. 62), Roman Abramovich injected equity at Chelsea amounting to
£60m in 2003, followed by the provision of another £820m of interest-free loans in the
following years, summing up to a total money injection of £880m as of 2012. In contrast
Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan preferred pure equity injections after his purchase
of Manchester City in 2008, which totaled £800m as of 2012. In essence the bailout
costs are opportunity costs: Instead of providing an interest-free loan to Chelsea, Mr.
Abramovich could have invested the £820m at market-rate.
Next, we introduce the SD’s objective function, which is given by
ΦSD(pb) = −pl(x)pbb+ (1− pl(x))µC(x,m). (1)
With probability pl(x) the club goes bankrupt and the SD bails out the club with prob-
ability pb yielding bailout costs of b. If s/he does not bail out the club, the club goes
6However, our results would remain qualitatively the same if we assumed that the SD is risk averse.
In this case, the SD objective function would include uC instead of µC .
7For tractability, we normalize the expected club value after a bailout in the case of a bankruptcy to
zero. However, our results would remain qualitatively the same if we assumed that the expected club in
such a case is given by µ˜v(x,m) ∈ [0, µv).
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bankrupt and its value is zero. With probability 1 − pl(x) the club gamble is successful
and the SD enjoys the expected club value µC(x,m). Even though the direct effect of
a higher bailout probability on the SD’s objective function is negative, the SD has in-
centives to bail out the club due to the indirect effects via a higher expected club value
induced through a riskier investment strategy.
The objective function of the club is given by
ΦC(x) = −pl(x)(1− pb)s+ (1− pl(x))uC(x). (2)
With probability pl(x) the club goes bankrupt. If the SD bails out the club (which occurs
with probability pb), the club value is zero. If the SD does not bail out the club (which
occurs with probability 1−pb), the club must bear the shutdown costs s. With probability
1− pl(x) the club does not go bankrupt and enjoys expected utility uC(x).
Social welfare is given by the sum of the objective functions of the SD and the club as
well as the collateral damage d caused by the club’s bankruptcy in case of a non-bailout:
ΦW = ΦC + ΦSD − pl(1− pb)d. (3)
The timing follows a two-stage structure:
• In Stage 1, the SD chooses the probability pb to bailout the club in case of bankruptcy.
• In Stage 2, given pb, the club chooses a certain level of riskiness x.
4.2 Analysis and Results
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibria via backward inductions. First, we analyze
the club’s optimal behavior regarding risk taking in Stage 2 and then, we derive the
optimal behavior of the SD regarding the bailout probability in Stage 1.
4.2.1 The club’s optimal behavior in Stage 2
In Stage 2, the club maximizes its objective function ΦC and thus solves the problem:
max
x∈R+
{ΦC(x) = −pl(x)(1− pb)s+ (1− pl(x))uC(x)}. (4)
By rearranging the corresponding first-order condition, the club-optimal level of riskiness
xC is then implicitly defined by
p′l(x
C)
[
(1− pb)s+ uC(xC)
]
= (1− pl(xC))u′C(xC), (5)
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with u′C(x
C) = ∂uC(x
C)
∂x
. We establish the following proposition.8
Proposition 1 The club-optimal level of riskiness xC is increasing in the bailout proba-
bility pb, i.e.,
∂xC
∂pb
> 0. Hence, the appearance of a SD induces the club to choose a riskier
strategy as compared to a scenario without a SD.
Proof. See Appendix.
The club’s optimality condition (5) has an intuitive interpretation. The left-hand
side (lhs) is the marginal costs of a riskier strategy. A higher x increases the likelihood
of going bankrupt, which induces costs (1 − pb)s and, at the same time, it decreases
the likelihood of a successful gamble, which implies a foregone utility of uC(x
C). The
right-hand side (rhs) is the marginal revenues of a riskier strategy because increasing x
produces a higher expected club value and therefore it has a direct positive effect on
the club’s utility uC(x
C). In equilibrium, the club chooses a strategy xC which exactly
balances out these effects.
Due to the possibility of a bailout, marginal costs of a higher level of riskiness (lhs)
decrease. As a result, the optimal level of riskiness xC increases with a higher bailout
probability pb and therefore the club always chooses a riskier strategy in a scenario with a
sugar daddy than without one. Put differently, our model suggests that the club decreases
its level of riskiness after the successful implementation of FFP because these regulations
make it more difficult for a SD to bail out the club.
Based on the less general model exposed in Appendix A.3, we analyze how the club’s
market size and the variance in the club value affect the club’s risk-taking behavior in
Corollary 1.9
Corollary 1 (i) The optimal level of riskiness xC increases with the club’s market size
m if and only if the responsiveness p′l of the bankruptcy function is not too large, i.e.,
∂xC
∂m
> 0⇔ p′l < p̂′l(x) ≡ 12xC .
(ii) For risk-averse clubs, the optimal level of riskiness xC decreases with the variance
σ2ε in the club value, while x
C increases for risk-seeking clubs, i.e., ∂x
C
∂σ2ε
< 0 ∀r > 0 and
∂xC
∂σ2ε
> 0 ∀r < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (i) of the corollary shows that a large club chooses a riskier strategy than a small
risk-averse club if the level of riskiness has a sufficiently low influence on the probability
of bankruptcy. This result is intuitively clear. A larger market size m increases both the
8Note that the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium xC is ensured as long as the shutdown
costs of the club in case of bankruptcy are sufficiently small, i.e., s < s′ ≡ u′C(0)p′l(0)(1−pb) (see Appendix A.1).
Otherwise, the club has no incentives to participate in the game.
9Note that we are not able to provide Proposition 1 in the general setting and therefore we must
further specify the model. Henceforth, we use corollaries for results that are based on the specific model.
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marginal costs and the marginal revenues of a riskier strategy.10 If the responsiveness
of the bankruptcy function is sufficiently small, i.e., p′l < p̂
′
l(x), then marginal revenues
increase stronger than marginal costs and the club increases its level of riskiness. The
reverse is true if p′l > p̂
′
l(x) so that a small club chooses a riskier strategy than a large
club.
According to part (ii) of the corollary, a more uncertain economic environment char-
acterized by a larger variance in the club value induces risk-seeking clubs to choose an
even riskier strategy. For risk-averse clubs, a more uncertain economic environment in-
duces a less risky strategy. A higher Champions League prize might produce a larger
variance in the club value and therefore can be interpreted as a more uncertain economic
environment. The reason for this result goes along the same lines as above. If the club is
risk averse, a higher variance σ2ε of the club value induces a decrease in both the marginal
costs and the marginal revenues of a riskier strategy.11 Because marginal revenues de-
crease stronger than marginal costs, the club reacts with a decrease in its level of riskiness.
The reverse is true if the club is risk seeking.
Turning now back to the general model again, we recall that the successful imple-
mentation of FFP and thus the abrogation of money injections from SDs is expected to
induce the club to reduce its level of riskiness. Next, we examine whether a less risky
investment strategy of the club is desirable also from a welfare perspective. To maximize
its objective function ΦW , the social planer would solve the problem:
max
x∈R+
{ΦW = ΦC + ΦSD − pl(1− pb)d}. (6)
We denote by xW the level of riskiness which maximizes social welfare ΦW and estab-
lish Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW increases with a higher bailout
probability pb if bailout costs are lower than combined shutdown costs and collateral dam-
age. Otherwise, the welfare-optimal level of riskiness decreases with a higher bailout
probability pb. Formally, i.e.,
∂xW
∂pb
≷ 0⇔ b ≶ s+ d.
Proof. See Appendix.
First of all, it is worth noting that a certain level of riskiness is desired from a welfare
perspective. The proposition shows that if the SD commits to bailout the club more
often, i.e., pb increases, then the effect on the welfare-optimal level of riskiness depends
on the relationship between bailout costs and the combined shutdown costs and collateral
10From the club’s optimality condition in Appendix A.3, we derive that marginal costs increase by
ϕx and marginal revenues increase by 1− ϕx.
11From the club’s optimality condition in Appendix A.3, we derive that marginal costs decrease by
−1/2rϕx2 and marginal revenues decrease by −(1− ϕx)rx.
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damage. Interestingly, it can be the case that through the implementation of FFP (i.e., pb
decreases), the welfare-optimal level of riskiness increases. This result is true if the bailout
costs are higher than the sum of shutdown costs and collateral damage. To understand
the intuition behind this result, we compute the welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW
which is implicitly defined by
p′l(x
W )
[
pbb+ (1− pb)(d+ s) + (µC(xW ) + uC(xW )
]
= (1− pl(xW ))
(
∂µC(x
W )
∂x
+
∂uC(x
W )
∂x
)
. (7)
Similar to above, the lhs represents the marginal costs of a riskier strategy, while the
rhs is the marginal revenues of a riskier strategy. Marginal costs decrease with a lower
bailout probability pb if b > s + d. In this case, a lower pb induces the welfare-optimal
level of riskiness xW to increase. If, however, b < s + d, marginal costs increase and xW
decreases with a lower bailout probability. In addition, as shown in Appendix A.2, there
are conditions under which a critical bailout probability p∗b exists that induces the club
to implement the welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW , i.e., xC(p∗b) = x
W (p∗b).
12 In other
words, an instrument can exist inducing the club to implement the welfare-maximizing
level of riskiness: namely, through an appropriate choice of the bailout probability p∗b .
In the next section, we switch to Stage 1 and analyze the optimal behavior of the SD.
4.2.2 The SD’s optimal behavior in Stage 1
In Stage 1, the SD anticipates the optimal club behavior xC in Stage 2 and thus s/he
solves the maximization problem
max
pb∈[0,1]
{ΦSD(pb) = −pl(xC)pbb+ (1− pl(xC))µC(xC)}. (8)
We establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ΦSD(pb) is quasi-concave and that there are multipliers λk ∈
R+, k ∈ {1, 2}.13 Then, pSDb is the unique global maximizer of problem (8), characterized
by:
[
1− pl(xC)
] ∂µC
∂x
∂xC
∂pb
−
(
pl(x
C)b+ p′l(x)
∂xC
∂pb
[
pSDb b+ µC(x
C)
])
+ λ1 − λ2 = 0 (9)
λ1p
SD
b = 0 and λ2(p
SD
b − 1) = 0. (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
12Necessary conditions for the existence of p∗b are b > s+ d and x
W > xC for pb = 0.
13Under reasonable conditions, i.e., if b is not too large, ΦSD(pb) is quasi-concave in pb.
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The first-order condition (9) implicitly defines the SD’s optimal choice with respect
to the bailout probability pSDb and has an intuitive interpretation. The first term (1 −
pl(x
C))∂µC
∂x
∂xC
∂pb
is the marginal revenue of a higher bailout probability pSDb and character-
izes the gain in utility through a higher level of riskiness xC (induced through a higher
pb) conditional on a non-bankruptcy of the club. The term in round brackets is the
marginal costs of a higher pb: increasing the probability of a bailout results in direct
costs pl(x
C)b but it also induces indirect negative effects through a higher risk-taking
behavior of the club. The bailout-induced riskier club strategy increases the bankruptcy
probability, which in turn yields higher expected bailout costs pSDb b and at the same time
implies a foregone utility of µC(x
C).
Basic intuition might suggest, that the SD never bails out the club (pSDb = 0) or always
bails out the club (pSDb = 1). However, as shown in Appendix A.4, the optimal bailout
probability pSDb for the SD is not necessarily a corner solution, i.e., it can be optimal for
the SD to bailout the club with a probability pSDb ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the optimal bailout
probability can be larger than zero even if the bailout costs exceed the collateral damage.
Finally, it is not necessarily the case that if the collateral damage exceeds the bailout
costs, then the optimal bailout probability is zero.
As mentioned above, the SD does not take into account that the club’s bankruptcy
in the case of a non-bailout produces a collateral damage of size d. We can interpret
such a SD as a ”private” SD, who does not care for any externality on society caused by
the club’s bankruptcy. However, one might argue that a ”public” SD actually takes this
collateral damage into account. Hence, the objective function for a public SD slightly
changes and it becomes
ΦpubSD(pb) = −pl(x) [pbb+ (1− pb)d] + (1− pl(x))uc(x). (11)
By comparing the optimal bailout probabilities of a private and public SD, we establish
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A public SD has a higher optimal bailout probability than a private SD
if the responsiveness of the bankruptcy function is not too large, i.e., p′l(x
C) < p̂′l(x
C) ≡
pl(x
C)
(1−pb)∂xC/∂pb .
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that a public SD bails out the club more often than a private
SD if a higher level of riskiness only weakly increases the club’s probability to become
bankrupt. The result is mainly driven by the additional concern of the public SD with
respect to the collateral damage in the case the club is shut down. To understand the
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intuition behind this result, consider the public SD’s optimality condition:
(1− pl(xC))∂µC
∂x
∂xC
∂pb
= pl(x
C) (b− d) + p′l(xC)
∂xC
∂pb
[
pSDb b+ (1− pb)d+ µC(xC)
]
(12)
The marginal revenue (1 − pl(xC))∂µC∂x ∂x
C
∂pb
of a higher bailout probability pSDb is not
directly affected by changes in the collateral damage d. However, changes in d directly
affect marginal costs of a higher pb. On the one hand, a higher d decreases direct costs
pl(x
C) (b− d) induced through a higher bailout probability. On the other hand, a higher
d increases costs in case the club is not bailed out which are given by (1 − pb)d. If
the responsiveness of the bankruptcy function is not too large, the indirect negative
effects through a higher risk-taking behavior of the club are dominated by the cost-saving
effect such that the SD increases the bailout probability pSDb . Formally, ∂p
SD
b /∂d > 0⇔
p′l(x
C) < p̂′l(x
C) ∀d ≥ 0. We conclude that a public SD has a higher optimal bailout
probability than a private SD because the private SD is a special case of a public SD
with d = 0.
In a next step, we are interested in the optimal bailout probability in Stage 1 from
a welfare perspective. For this analysis, we again use the less general model from Ap-
pendix A.3 and denote by pWb , the bailout probability which maximizes social welfare
ΦW . To determine p
W
b , we substitute x
C into ΦW and solve the maximization problem
maxpb∈[0,1] ΦW (pb). Although it is possible to derive the welfare-optimal bailout probabil-
ity pWb in closed form, the comparative statics are analytically not tractable. We therefore
rely on numerical simulations and derive the following results.
Corollary 2 (i) If the bailout costs are sufficiently low, then the welfare-optimal bailout
probability pWb increases with a larger market size, i.e.,
∂pWb
∂m
> 0 if b < b′. It follows that
the social planer would always bailout a club whose market size is sufficiently large, i.e.,
pWb = 1 if m > m
′ and b < b′.
(ii) The welfare-optimal bailout probability pWb decreases with a higher variance σ
2
ε in
the club value if clubs are risk seeking, while pWb increases if clubs are risk averse, i.e.,
∂pWb
∂σ2ε
< 0 ∀r < 0 and ∂pWb
∂σ2ε
> 0 ∀r > 0.
Part (i) shows that a ”too-big-to-fail” phenomenon exists. From a welfare perspective,
a sufficiently large club should always be bailed out if the bailout costs are under a certain
threshold. The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider the optimality condition of
the social planer. A larger market size increases both the marginal costs and the marginal
revenues of a higher bailout probability. The bailout costs b have a direct effect only on
the marginal costs. Hence, if b is sufficiently low, the increase in marginal revenues
induced by a larger market size overcompensates for the decrease in marginal costs and
as a result, the bailout probability pWb increases in m. If the market size is sufficiently
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large, the bailout probability reaches its maximum value of 1, which means that the social
planer would always choose to bailout the club.
Part (ii) posits that a more uncertain economic environment characterized by a larger
variance in the club value would induce the social planer to bailout the club more often
(contrary to the result regarding the optimal level of riskiness above) if the club is risk
averse and less often if it is risk seeking. To understand the intuition behind this result,
we consider the social planer’s optimality condition once again. Suppose that the club is
risk averse. From Proposition 1, we know that a higher variance σ2ε reduces the club’s
level of riskiness xC and thus decreases the bankruptcy probability pl(x
C). Hence, a
higher variance σ2ε increases the marginal revenues of a higher bailout probability and
decreases marginal costs. As result, the social planer would have an incentive to increase
the bailout probability pWb . The reverse is true if the club is risk seeking.
According to Pawlowski et al. (2010), the payments to the participating teams in the
UEFA Champions League have experienced a large increase since the extension of the
participating teams from 24 to 32 in the 1999-2000 season combined with a change in
the payout structure. As mentioned above, an increase in the Champions League prize
can be interpreted as an increase in the variance of the club value. Hence, part (ii) of
Result 2 suggests that it depends on the risk preference of the clubs whether the FFP
regulations are desirable from a welfare perspective. If the clubs are risk seeking, then
according to our model the abolition of the bailout mechanisms through the new FFP
regulations are welfare-enhancing, while the reverse is true if clubs are risk averse.
Finally, we show that a conflict with respect to the appropriate bailout probability
between the social planer and the SD can exist.
Corollary 3 The incentives of the SD and the social planer are not aligned. There are
constellations under which (a) the social planer would choose a lower bailout probability
than the SD, i.e., pWb < p
SD
b , and (b) the social planer would choose a higher bailout
probability than the SD, i.e., pWb > p
SD
b .
We illustrate this result in Figure 1 by depicting ΦSD(pb) and ΦW (pb) as functions of
the bailout probability for the following parameter constellation: r = 1, b = 2, d = 0.1,
s = 1, 5, σ2ε = 0.5, and p
′
l = 0.5. Panel (a) reports the case where the club’s market size
is small with m = 0.1 and in Panel (b), the club’s market is large with m = 1. The
figure shows that in the case of a small market size, the social planer would choose a
lower bailout probability than the SD, while the opposite is true if the market size of the
club is large. From Result 1, we know that the social planer would bailout a large club
(m = 1) with a higher probability than a small club (m = 0.1) if the bailout costs are
sufficiently small. However, under the same parameter constellations, the SD decreases
the bailout probability from pSDb ≈ 0.55 for a small club to pSDb ≈ 0.22 for a large club.
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Figure 1: The Objective Function of the SD and the Social Planer
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5 Other Potential Effects of Money Injections
At first sight, the new FFP regulations seem to be counter-productive. Why should a
regulation aim to limit available funds, rather than allowing entry of as much funding as
possible and instead only pursuing the regulatory target of ensuring sound financial use
of the available funds?14 However, the above analysis has shown that the existence of
a sugar daddy paying the open bills of a club when the gamble on success went wrong
may induce the club to choose a riskier investment strategy as compared to the scenario
in which the sugar daddy is not present. The more the sugar daddy commits himself to
bailout the club – or the less the sugar daddy is able to commit not to bailout the club
– the more the clubs’ optimal level of riskiness is expected to increase. In this section,
we shed further light on how money injections of sugar daddies may contribute to some
other potential inefficiencies in football leagues.15
5.1 Contagion of other clubs due to increased risk-taking
It seems plausible that a riskier investment strategy of a club with a sugar daddy leads to
contagion inducing clubs without sugar daddies to pursue riskier strategies too. However,
a proper analysis would require a model with at least two clubs. To further elaborate on
this issue, we develop a simple contest model of two profit-maximizing clubs and show
14We are very much indebted to our colleague Paul Madden for formulating this important question
in direct communication with Egon Franck. See also Madden (2012b) for a detailed analysis.
15UEFA invited a group of sports economists to Geneva in January 2012 to discuss the expected
impact of the new FFP regulations. The following potential inefficiencies are taken from a (subjective)
summary of the discussion proposed by Egon Franck. Wladimir Andreff deserves to be mentioned for
strongly advocating that bailouts induce clubs to take excessive risk and Jamie Oliver for bringing up
the issue of non-virtuous competitive imbalance.
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that increasing the investment level yi of club i induces the other club j to increase its
investment level yj too.
16 By assuming a positive correlation between a riskier investment
strategy and a higher investment level, this result suggests that under certain conditions
a contagion effect might emerge.
We base our analysis on a widely-used profit function in the sports economics litera-
ture. Specifically, the profit function of club i = 1, 2 is given by
pii(yi, yj) = Ri(yi, yj)− C(yi)
=
mi
4
(
2wi(yi, yj)− wi(yi, yj)2
)− cyi, (13)
where wi(yi, yj) =
yi
yi+yj
is the win percentage of club i and mi ∈ R+ represents the
market size parameter of club i. We assume that clubs are heterogeneous with respect
to their market size or drawing potential. Without loss of generality, we assume that
m1 = m > m2 = 1. This profit function is consistent with the revenue functions used
e.g. in Hoehn and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and Ke´senne (2004),
Ke´senne (2006, 2007), Vrooman (2007, 2008), and Dietl et al. (2009).
We compute the equilibrium investment levels as
(y∗1, y
∗
2) =
(
m3/2
2c(
√
m+ 1)3
,
m
2c(
√
m+ 1)3
)
. (14)
The reaction functions of club 1 and 2 are given by
R1(y2) =
(m
2c
)1/3
y
2/3
2 − y2 and R2(y1) =
(
1
2c
)1/3
y
2/3
1 − y1 (15)
and we derive
∂R1
∂y2
∣∣∣∣
y2=y∗2
=
1
3
(2
√
m− 1) > 0 and ∂R2
∂y1
∣∣∣∣
y1=y∗1
= −1
3
+
2
3
√
m
> 0⇔ m < 4 (16)
Hence, the large club 1 increases its investments in response to a marginal increase of
the small club 2’s investments. The same is true for the small club’s investments as long
as the large club’s market size m is not too large.
Now we turn back to our analysis where a benefactor (SD) injects money into a club
in case of a bankruptcy. Suppose that only the small club is owned by a SD. According
to our analysis in Section 4, the appearance of a SD induces the small club to choose a
riskier investment strategy as compared to a scenario without a SD. What is the effect on
the large club, which is not owned by a SD? By assuming a positive correlation between
16Besides profit-maximizers, the sports economics literature has modeled sports clubs as win-
maximizers (Ke´senne 2006), utility-maximizers (Madden and Robinson 2012) and fan-utility maximizers
(Madden 2012a).
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a riskier investment strategy and a higher investment level, we know from equation (16)
that there is a contagion effect on the large club in the sense that it reacts with a higher
investment level and thus a riskier strategy. As a consequence, the appearance of a
SD yields higher investment levels and riskier strategies for both clubs compared to the
initial equilibrium. This simple analysis implies that riskier strategies of clubs with a
sugar daddy can increase the contagion risk in the entire industry.
5.2 Increased volatility due to less financial diversification of
income streams
If the money injections of benefactors are more volatile than other sources of revenue
(e.g. broadcasting or attendances), then increasingly relying on the sugar daddy finance
model introduces more volatility into the financial structure of football. It becomes more
difficult to plan and to manage a club in a way that it reaches break-even in this scenario,
where the instantaneous introduction or withdrawal of large amounts of money produce
demand shocks in the player market. It seems plausible to assume more volatility in
a sugar daddy finance model. First, the provision of funds stems from the decision and
motivation of a single individual, which makes it more easily reversible than the thousands
of dispersed and therefore more independent decisions of spectators to buy tickets, fans to
buy merchandise etc. Second, the business of a single individual may be more vulnerable
to risk than a multitude of smaller streams of income originating from diverse sources
(attendance, broadcasting, sponsoring etc.).
5.3 Increased non-virtuous competitive imbalance
Money injections by new owners entering the football business from outside and “buying
success” by investing large amounts of “external” funds into the creation of a competitive
team may be perceived as sources of non-virtuous competitive imbalance, which at the
end reduce the acceptance of the game. Fans of (other clubs) may simply turn away and
look for alternatives if “some foreigner” comes around and simply buys success in their
eyes by spending “external” money on players.
Against this background the FFP rules can be seen as limiting these three potential
inefficiencies. By abrogating systematic bailouts the FFP rules induce club managers to
take less risk, which also reduces the likelihood of contagion. By channeling sugar daddy
investment into stadia, infrastructure etc., the FFP rules transform volatile sources of
income into more stable income from gate attendance, merchandising, sponsoring and
so on. By inducing sugar daddies to invest into infrastructure, community and youth
development, they gain legitimacy and are transformed into virtuous owners, who are
then not seen as a source of non-virtuous competitive imbalance any longer.
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However, so far the discussion has been taking place without any stringent theoretical
or empirical proof of the claims presented. Here our paper intended to make a first
contribution by analyzing the relationship between money injections by a sugar daddy
and risk-taking at the club level.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an analytical model of a representative club and a sugar daddy
to study the consequences of the FFP regulations on the riskiness of the club’s investment
strategy. Our model clearly shows that the money injections of sugar daddies induce the
club to implement a riskier investment strategy. With the limitations of the “one-club
model” setting in mind, we have nevertheless tried to incorporate some basic welfare-
tradeoffs in our analysis. A certain level of riskiness is desirable from a welfare perspective.
Whether the club-optimal level of riskiness is higher than the corresponding level from a
welfare perspective depends on the bailout probability as well as the relationship between
bailout costs versus combined shutdown costs and collateral damage. We find that a
certain bailout probability can exist that induces the club to implement the welfare-
optimal level of riskiness. Moreover, our model shows that a small-market club chooses
a riskier investment strategy than a large-market club if the club’s investment strategy
has a sufficiently large influence on the club’s bankruptcy probability. A more uncertain
economic environment characterized, e.g., through a larger Champions League prize,
induces risk seeking clubs to implement a riskier investment strategy and risk averse
clubs to implement a less risky strategy.
Regarding the optimal behavior of the sugar daddy, we find that the optimal bailout
probability is not necessarily a corner solution. Additionally, it can be optimal for a
sugar daddy to bailout the club even if the bailout costs exceed the collateral damage.
Differentiating between public and private sugar daddies, we derive that the former have
incentives to bail out the club with a higher probability than the later. Moreover, we
identify a “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon because, from a welfare perspective, it can be
optimal to always bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently large. By comparing the
welfare-optimal bailout probability with the respective probability for the sugar daddy,
we deduce that the incentives of the social planer and the sugar daddy are not aligned
such that the social planer can choose a lower bailout probability than the sugar daddy,
and vice versa. Finally, we derive conditions under which the FFP and the pre-FFP reg-
ulations, respectively, are desirable from a welfare perspective. For example, an increase
in the Champions League prize renders the new FFP regulations less desirable from a
welfare perspective if clubs are risk averse, while the new FFP regulations are welfare-
enhancing if clubs are risk seeking. Provided that 56% of the 734 European top division
clubs reported net losses in the financial year 2010 and dissipated financial value equaling
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almost e 1.7 billion, risk aversion at least doesn’t seem to be a widespread phenomenon
in this industry.
We are aware of the fact that the our model is designed to handle only a limited
and singular aspect of the potential effects of money injections in football clubs, their
effect on risk taking at the club level. Already the extension in welfare analysis is more
speculative, as it is constrained by the “one-club model” setting. It goes without saying
that an overall assessment of the consequences of FFP might only be possible in a much
more sophisticated model that captures all potential inefficiencies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The first-order condition for the maximization problem (1) is given by
∂ΦC
∂x
= −p′l(xC)
[
(1− pb)s+ uC(xC)
]
+ (1− pl(xC))u′C(xC) = 0, (17)
with u′C(x
C) = ∂uC(x
C)
∂x
. The second-order condition yields
∂2ΦC
∂x2
= −p′′l (xC)
[
(1− pb)s+ uC(xC)
]− 2p′l(xC)u′C(xC) + (1− pl(xC))u′′C(xC) < 0, (18)
with u′′C(x
C) = ∂
2uC(x
C)
∂x2
. If r > 0, then according to A.3 it holds u′′C(x
C) < 0, and hence,
the second-order condition is always satisfied. If r < 0, then u′′C(x
C) > 0, and as a result,
the second-order condition is satisfied if only if ζ ≡ (1 − pl(xC))u′′C(xC) is sufficiently
small.
To show that the club-optimal level of riskiness xC is increasing in the bailout prob-
ability pb, i.e.,
∂xC
∂pb
> 0 we proceed as follows. Define
F := −p′l(xC)
[
(1− pb)s+ uC(xC)
]
+ (1− pl(xC))∂uC(x
C)
∂x
= 0. (19)
The implicit function theorem gives us ∂x
C
∂pb
= − ∂F/∂pb
∂F/∂xC
.Because ∂F
∂xC
is the second-order
condition, we know that ∂F
∂xC
< 0 and hence sign
[
∂xC
∂pb
]
= sign
[
∂F
∂pb
]
. We compute ∂F
∂pb
=
p′l(x
C)s > 0, which proves the claim.
Next, we examine the conditions under which the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium xC is ensured. We denote the lhs and rhs of the optimality condition (5) as
κl(x) = p
′
l(x) [(1− pb)s+ uC(x)] and κr(x) = (1− pl(x))
∂uC(x)
∂x
, (20)
respectively. We compute
∂κl(x)
∂x
= p′′l (x) [(1− pb)s+ uC(x)] + p′l(x)
∂uC(x)
∂x
> 0 and (21)
∂κr(x)
∂x
= −p′l(x)
∂uC(x)
∂x
+ (1− pl(x))∂
2uC(x)
∂x2
. (22)
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium xC , we need the following
additional assumption:
s < s′ ≡ ∂uC(0)/∂x
p′l(0)(1− pb)
(23)
Under this assumption, we will show that ∃! x∗ > 0 : κl(x∗) = κr(x∗). Suppose that x = 0.
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In this case, κl(0) = p
′
l(0)(1 − pb)s > 0 and κr(0) = ∂uC(0)∂x > 0. Because (23) holds, we
derive κr(0) > κl(0). Recall from the discussion about the second-order conditions that
ζ = (1 − pl(xC))∂2uC(xC)∂x2 is sufficiently small and hence, ∂κl(x)∂x >
∣∣∣∂κr(x)∂x ∣∣∣ . Because ∂κl(x)∂x
and ∂κr(x)
∂x
are well-defined and continuous functions in x, there exists a value x∗ = xC
such that κl(x
∗) = κr(x∗). This point of intersection characterizes the unique equilibrium.
We conclude that the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium xC is ensured as
long as the shutdown costs of the club in case of bankruptcy are sufficiently small with
s < s′ ≡ u′C(0)
p′l(0)(1−pb)
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The first-order condition for the maximization problem (6) is given by
∂ΦW
∂x
= −p′l(xW )
[
pbb+ (1− pb)(d+ s) + (µC(xW ) + uC(xW )
]
+(1− pl(xW ))
(
∂µC(x
W )
∂x
+
∂uC(x
W )
∂x
)
= 0. (24)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied, i.e., ∂
2ΦW
∂x2
< 0. To show that
∂xW
∂pb
> 0⇔ b < s+ d, we define G = ∂ΦW
∂x
= 0. The implicit function theorem gives us
∂xW
∂pb
= − ∂G/∂pb
∂G/∂xW
= −(d+ s− b)p
′
l(x
W )
∂2ΦW/∂x2
> 0⇔ b < s+ d, (25)
which completes the proof of the proposition.
In the discussion of the proposition, we claimed that there are conditions under which
a bailout probability p∗b exists so that the club implements the welfare-optimal level
of riskiness xW . Necessary conditions for such a critical bailout probability p∗b to exist
are b > s + d and xW > xC for pb = 0. That is, bailout costs are higher than combined
shutdown costs and collateral damage. Additionally, the welfare-optimal level of riskiness
must be higher than the club-optimal level in the absence of a SD. (I) Suppose that
b > s+d. According to part (i) of Proposition 2, the welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW
decreases in pb, i.e.,
∂xW
∂pb
< 0. (II) Suppose that xW > xC for pb = 0 (2). Together with the
fact that the club-optimal level of riskiness xC increases in pb (i.e.,
∂xC
∂pb
> 0), assumptions
(I) and (II) are necessary conditions for the claim that a critical bailout probability p∗b
exists so that xW (p∗b) = x
C(p∗b). Figure 2 qualitatively illustrates this result by depicting
the welfare- and club-optimal levels of riskiness xW and xC , respectively, as functions of
the bailout probability pb.
The assumption (II) makes sense if the collateral damage d is sufficiently small. Note
that changes in the value of the collateral damage d have no effect on the club-optimal
level of riskiness xC , i.e., ∂x
C
∂d
= 0, whereas the welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW is
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Figure 2: Implementation of the Welfare-optimal Level of Riskiness
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decreasing in the collateral damage d, i.e., ∂x
W
∂d
< 0. To see this, we derive with the help
of the implicit function theorem ∂x
W
∂d
= − ∂G/∂d
∂G/∂xW
=
(1−pb)p′l(xW )
∂2ΦW /∂x2
< 0. Hence, a lower d
induces a higher welfare-optimal level of riskiness xW .
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
To analyze how the club’s market size and the variance in the club value affect the club’s
risk-taking behavior, we further specify the model and assume that the club value is
given by v(x) = x · (m+ ε) + pi,with a normally distributed error term ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε). The
parameter pi ∈ R+ is deterministic and represents the club value if the club chooses no
risk. From this value function, we derive the expected club value µC(x) = mx + pi and
the variance in the club value V [v] = σ2εx
2. We assume that the club’s expected utility is
given by uC(x) = mx + pi − r2σ2εx2. Moreover, we assume that the bankruptcy function
yields pl(x) = ϕx with ϕ > 0 sufficiently small to ensure that pl(x) ≤ 1. This specification
of our model satisfies Assumptions A1-A4.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibria via backward inductions. In Stage 2, the
club maximizes its objective function ΦC and thus solves the problem:
max
x∈R+
{ΦC(x) = −ϕx(1− pb)s+ (1− ϕx)(mx+ pi − r
2
σ2εx
2)}. (26)
The first-order and second-order conditions for the club’s maximization problem are given
by
∂ΦC
∂x
= −ϕ [(1− pb)s+mx+ pi − r2σ2εx2]+ (1− ϕx)(m− rσ2εx) = 0,
∂2ΦC
∂x2
= −2ϕ(m− rσ2εx)− (1− ϕx)rσ2ε < 0.
(27)
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The club-optimal level of riskiness is then given by
xC =
1
3rσ2εϕ
(
rσ2ε + 2mϕ−
(
r2σ4ε + 4(mϕ)
2 − 2rσ2εϕ(m− 3ϕ[pi + s(1− pb)]
)1/2)
. (28)
Part (i). To show how the club-optimal level of riskiness xC reacts to changes in m,
we define
F := −ϕ
[
(1− pb)s+mx+ pi − r
2
σ2εx
2
]
+ (1− ϕx)(m− rσ2εx) = 0. (29)
The implicit function theorem gives us ∂x
C
∂m
= − ∂F/∂m
∂F/∂xC
. Because ∂F
∂xC
is the second-order
condition, we derive sign
[
∂xC
∂m
]
= sign
[
∂F
∂m
]
. We compute ∂F
∂m
= 1−2ϕxC ≷ 0⇔ ϕ ≶ 1
2xC
,
which proves the claim.
Part (ii). To show how the club-optimal level of riskiness xC reacts to changes in σ2ε ,
we define
G := −ϕ
[
(1− pb)s+mx+ pi − r
2
σ2εx
2
]
+ (1− ϕx)(m− rσ2εx) = 0. (30)
The implicit function theorem gives us ∂x
C
∂σ2ε
= − ∂G/∂σ2ε
∂G/∂xC
. Because ∂G
∂xC
is the second-order
condition, we derive sign
[
∂xC
∂σ2ε
]
= sign
[
∂G
∂σ2ε
]
and compute
∂G
∂σ2ε
=
1
2
rϕx2 − (1− ϕx)rx = rx
(
3
2
ϕx− 1
)
(31)
We compute
κ ≡ 3
2
ϕxC − 1 = rσ
2
ε + 2mϕ− (r2σ4ε + 4(mϕ)2 − 2rσ2εϕ(m− 3ϕ[pi + s(1− pb)])1/2
2rσ2ε
− 1
(32)
and derive κ < 0 ⇔ m > −3ϕ(pi + s(1 − pb)). Hence, κ is always smaller than zero
for all m > 0. Because sign
[
∂xC
∂σ2ε
]
= sign
[
∂G
∂σ2ε
]
, we conclude ∂x
C
∂σ2ε
< 0 ⇔ r > 0 and
∂xC
∂σ2ε
> 0⇔ r < 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The derivation of condition (9), which implicitly defines the SD’s optimal choice with
respect to the bailout probability pSDb , is straightforward by applying the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Whether an interior solution pSDb ∈ (0, 1) exists depends on the parameters
of the model. Specifically, a necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution
pSDb ∈ (0, 1) is that the bailout costs b are bounded form below and above, i.e., b ∈ (b, b).
Hence, the optimal bailout probability for the SD is not necessarily a corner solution.
To derive the necessary conditions for an interior solution pSDb ∈ (0, 1), we proceed as
24
follows. We rearrange the first-order condition and define λMC(pb) and λMR(pb) as
λMC(pb) = pl(x
C)b+ p′l(x
C)∂x
C
∂pb
[
pbb+ µC(x
C)
]
and
λMR(pb) = (1− pl(xC))∂µC∂x ∂x
C
∂pb
,
(33)
respectively. λMC(pb) represents the marginal costs and λMR(x) is the marginal revenue
of a higher bailout probability pb. It is easy to show that
∂λMC(pb)
∂pb
> 0. Moreover, we
derive
∂λMR(pb)
∂pb
= −p′l(x)
∂xC
∂pb
(
∂µC
∂x
∂xC
∂pb
)
+ (1− pl(xC))∂µC
∂x
∂2xC
∂p2b
.
To ensure that the second-order condition holds, the term (1 − pl(x))∂µC∂x ∂
2xC
∂p2b
must be
sufficiently small and hence ∂λMR(pb)
∂pb
< 0.
To prove the claim, we need the following additional assumptions:
b < b ≡ 1
pl(x0)
(
(1− pl(x0))∂µC∂x ∂x0∂pb − p′l(x0)∂x0∂pb µC(x0)
)
b > b ≡ 1
pl(x1)
(
(1− pl(x1))∂µC∂x ∂x1∂pb − p′l(x1)∂x1∂pb [b+ µC(x1)]
) (34)
where x0 = x
C(0) and x1 = x
C(1) is the club-optimal level of riskiness for a bailout
probability of 0 and 1, respectively. The assumption b < b ensures that λMC(0) < λMR(0)
and b > b ensures that λMC(1) > λMR(1). Together with
∂λMC(pb)
∂pb
> 0 and ∂λMR(pb)
∂pb
< 0,
we derive that there must exists an interior pSDb , i.e., p
SD
b ∈ (0, 1) that maximizes ΦSD(pb).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To show that a public SD has a higher optimal bailout probability than a private SD
if the responsiveness p′l(x) of the bankruptcy function is not too large, we proceed as
follows. Define H as the first-order condition of a public SD, i.e.,
H :=
∂ΦpubSD(pb)
∂pb
= −
(
pl(x
C) (b− d) + p′l(xC)
∂xC
∂pb
[
pSDb b+ (1− pb)d+ µC(xC)
])
+(1− pl(xC))∂µC
∂x
∂xC
∂pb
= 0.
(35)
Then, the implicit function theorem gives us
∂pSDb
∂d
= − ∂H/∂d
∂H/∂pb
. We know that the denom-
inator is negative because ∂H/∂pb are the second-order conditions which are negative.
Hence, sign
[
∂pSDb /∂d
]
= sign[∂H/∂d] . We derive
∂H
∂d
= pl(x
C)− (1− pb)p′l(xC)
∂xC
∂pb
> 0⇔ p′l(xC) < p̂′l(xC) ≡
pl(x
C)
(1− pb)∂xC/∂pb (36)
We conclude that the optimal bailout probability of a public SD increases with a
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higher collateral damage d if p′l(x
C) < p̂′l(x
C) and it decrease with a higher collateral
damage if p′l(x
C) > p̂′l(x
C). Particularly,
∂pSDb
∂d
∣∣∣
d=0
> 0 ⇔ p′l(xC) < p̂′l(xC), which shows
that a public SD has a higher bailout probability than a private SD if p′l(x
C) < p̂′l(x
C).
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